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THE PLACE OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
WITHIN THE PATTERNS AND POLICIES OF PROTECTION
AGAINST WAGE-LOSS
STEFAN A. RIESENFELD*
The following paper1 deals with an intricate and perplexing sub-
ject, covering an'enormous expanse. For modern society has produced
income-maintenance schemes of infinite variety and tremendous com-
plexity. Perhaps the most outstanding and important point is the
fact that it has developed them at all. When, however, it comes to
classifying the different existing systems and to unraveling and cor-
relating their underlying policies, a task resembling the labor of the
Danaides2 is assumed.
I.
CHIEF CHARACTERISTICS AND POLICIES
OF THE AIiIERcAN SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
a. Legislative v. Contractual Social Security.
Perhaps the most fundamental classification of the American social
security3 or income maintenance system is that based on their source,
i.e., the differentiation between legislative and contractual social secur-
ity. No student of the American legislative income maintenance
* Professor of law, University of California, Berkeley. Co-author, RIEsEN-
FELD & MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION (1950).
1. This article is the revised version of a paper delivered before the Round
Table on Protection Against Wage Loss in the United States held during the
Christmas meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. The revision
was necessary because of the restriction to Unemployment Insurance of this
symposium.
2. As many a reader will remember, this mythological labor consisted of
the never-ending assignment to fill a barrel by drawing water with a sieve.
Evidently even the ancient Greeks already possessed sufficient ingenuity to
think up good WPA projects.
3. It is perhaps interesting to note that the term "social security" in a spe-
cific and institutional sense was first used in the United States, although the
details of its authorship are obscure. Abraham Epstein, the late Executive
Secretary of the American Association of Social Security, is usually credited
with the introduction of the phrase. See FoRKOScH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW
24 n.1 (1953), with further references. From the United States the concept and
the expression passed quickly not only into the parlance and ideology of other
English-speaking nations, but was accepted also into the vocabulary and
thought of other peoples, especially those having French, Italian or Spanish as
their native tongue. For scholarly treatments of the development and signifi-
cance of the notion of social security see especially Stack, The Meaning of Social
Security, 23 J. Comp. LEG. & INT'L L. 113 (3d ser. 1941); DURAND, LA POLITIQUE
CONTEMPORAINE DE SECURITE SOCIALE (1953); FERRARI, Los PmnIcIPIos DE LA
SECURIDAD SOCIAL (Montevideo, 1955). Professor Durand mentions that Simon
Bolivar used the expression "social security" as early as in 1819. DURAND, op. cit.
supra, at 13.
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schemes can overlook the fact that in recent years the establishment
of private pension and health and welfare plans has spread with
rapidity and effectiveness. While a number of them are management-
initiated,4 apparently the majority of them is the result of collective
bargaining. The number of persons covered by such contractual plans
is not known with accuracy. The National Planning Association esti-
mated in 1952 that in the year 1951, 14,000 retirement plans covering
9.6 million workers were in existence.5 In 1953 a spokesman for the
Treasury disclosed that 24,000 retirement plans had found Treasury
approval, that 20,000 of them were in operation and that coverage
extended to roughly 10,000,000 workers. 6 In other words, 15 percent
of the active labor force benefits from such private arrangements. With
respect to health and welfare plans even less information of recent
character is available, but it seems safe to assume that this type of
contractual protection exterfds to an at least equally large segment of
American labor.7 A similar development has occurred in the United
Kingdom, where the number of superannuation schemes in industry
and commerce (whether nationalized or not) is estimated to cover
more than 5 million workers.
8
Naturally the existence of such added protection for a large segment
of the population raises important policy questions.9 To say that there
is no rivalry between the legislative and bargained arrangements and
that the contractual benefits are merely "supplementary" is not a
complete answer and, in some respects, a mere veiling of the true
problems. Our value judgments concerning the proper level of legis-
lative benefits, their adequacy, will be affected by the availability of
other protection. Of course, where contractual plans are of the "inte-
grated" type, i.e., according "credit" for legislative benefits, the friction
4. For an interesting case construing the provision for permanent and total
disability in a management-initiated Employees' Retirement Annuity Plan,
see Pollock v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 124 F. Supp. 675 (N.D. W. Va. 1954).
5. PENSIONS I THE UNITED STATES, A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE JOINT COM-
IVITTEE ON THE EcoNomVric REPORT BY THE NATIONAL PLANNING AssocIATIoN,
Joint Committee Print, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1952).
6. Analysis of the Social Security System, Hearings before a Subcommittee
of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess., Part 1, 67 (1953). This estimate referred only to pension plans.
7. A nation-wide study of employee-benefit plans conducted by the Depart-
ment of Labor in 1950 revealed that 7,128,000 workers were covered by health
and welfare plans, while only 5,123,000 were protected by pension plans.
72 MoNTi. LAB. REv. 156 (1951). An examination of 1,565 union contracts
negotiated in California disclosed in 1953 that 758 of them covering 765,000
workers included health and welfare benefits. Gershenson, Health and Wel-
fare Plans Negotiated in California, 1953, 77 MONTH. LAB. REV. 11 (1954).
8. Report of Committee on Economic and Financial Problems of the Provision
for Old Age, CyM. No. 9333 at 81 (1954). This document is often referred to as
the Phillips Committee report.
9. For a discussion of these "implications" see also 2 LARSON, LAw OF WORK-
mEN's CoMPENsATION, § 97.64 (1952) and PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 57.
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is at least greatly minimized. But fewer and fewer plans incorporate
dovetailing clauses. 10 Should legislative schemes curtail benefits,
though otherwise available, because applicable contractual plans ac-
cord concurrent income maintenance rights? Of course, if and to the
extent that legislative benefits depend upon "need" the answer is easy
and unequivocal But how about benefits independent of need?
The present Old Age and Survivors Insurance Act provides for
"deductions" if the old age insurance beneficiary prior to his seventy-
second birthday has "earnings" in excess of $1200 in the form of
"wages" or "from self-employment."" While the employment or self-
employment for purposes of such deductions need no longer be covered
employment or self-employment, the income which entails the deduc-
tions must be "remuneration" for "service performed" or "income
from any trade or business."'12 Benefits under a contractual pension
or welfare plan can hardly be said to have this nature; conversely, in
fact, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 considers "integrated" pension
plans as non-discriminatory for purposes of qualification, 13 but does
not render dovetailing a requirement for qualifying. Such treatment
of contractual retirement benefits is justified by the purpose to be
achieved with the so-called "work clause" of the Social Security Act.
Although recent critics of the Social Security Act amendments of 1954
have decried the deduction provisions in question as a means test in
disguise, 14 the fact remains that they are meant to predicate eligibility
upon withdrawal from active participation in occupational life, i.e., to
operate as a retirement test.' 5 As a result, income other than earnings
from such active occupational engagements should be considered as not
within the intendment of the deduction clause. While perhaps the
legislative emphasis on retirement betrays the depression origins of
the Social Security Act, it is worth noting that the British National
Insurance Act, 1946, repeated the American pattern and provided for
a retirement requirement and deductions because of income "from
a gainful occupation."'1 6 The Beveridge Report which formed the
10. A recent survey of the pension agreements in the automobile industry
has revealed a "definite trend" toward non-integrated plans, Stanley, Pension
Plans Negotiated by the UAW-CIO, 77 MONTH. LAB. REV. 13 (1954). It seems
likely that this finding can be generalized.
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 403(b), (e)i (Supp. 1954).
12. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 409, 410, 411 (Supp. 1954).
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 401 (a) (5). No express proscription of dis-
criminatory plans was inserted into the new Code with respect to health and
welfare plans. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 105 (e). On the legislative history of the
tax treatment of health and welfare plans under the new code see Comment,
Taxation of Employee Accident and Health Plans Before and Under the 1954
Code, 64 YALE L.J. 222, at 229-34 (1954).
14. TenBroek and Wilson, The New Look in Social Security-Utopia or
Myopia, 6 HASTINGs L.J. 34, 45 (1954).
15. Myers, Basis and Background of the Retirement Test, 17 Soc. SEC. BULL.
No. 3,14 (1954).
16. National Insurance Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEo. 6, c. 67 §§ 20, 78(1).
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blueprint for the change from old age benefits to retirement benefits
disavowed expressly any equiparation between "means test" and re-
tirement condition and based the introduction of the latter upon
arguments of social justice and fiscal policy.
17
Similar considerations apply to the other branches of social in-
surance. In the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, dis-
ability payments under a health and welfare plan should not be
deemed to be an advancement of, or entitled to credit on, statutory
workmen's compensation benefits, although voluntary payments in the
interest of good labor-management relations may be so treated. 18 In
the same vein courts have held that receipt of retirement benefits does
not necessarily preclude entitlement to unemployment compensation,
although it will have this effect if it proves actual withdrawal from the
labor market.19 The resumption by organized labor of its drive, initi-
ated in 1944,20 for guaranteed wage plans, in particular, requires careful
study of the interrelation of this type of protection against wage-loss
from unemployment with the existing method of unemployment in-
surance. Various arrangements for coordination and integration have
been suggested,21 and the ultimate solution will depend on policy con-
17. Social Insurance and Allied Services, Report by Sir William Beveridge,
CMD. No. 6404 §§ 244, 245 (1942). Lord Beveridge returned to the problem in
his recent paper The Welfare Concept: Government's Role Re-examined, Na-
tional Industrial Conference Board 10 (mimeo. 1954). The Beveridge Report
expressly disclaimed any intention "to encourage or hasten retirement." In
fact the British law puts a bonus in form of a pension increase on postponed
retirement.
18. See e.g. Nichols v. Colonial Beacon Oil Co., 284 App. Div. 581, 132 N.Y.
Supp. 72 (3d Dep't 1954); Lion Oil Co. v. Reeves, 221 Ark. 5, 254 S.W.2d 450
(1952).
19. Keystone Mining Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 167 Pa. Super.
256, 75 A.2d 3 (1950); Fleiszig v. Board of Rev., 412 Ill. 49, 104 N.E.2d 818
(1952); Stricklin v. Annunzio, 413 Ill. 324, 109 N.E.2d 183 (1952); Bennett v.
Review Bd. of Indiana Empl. Sec. Div., 122 Ind. App. 14, 102 N.E.2d 382 (1951);
Campbell Soup Co. v. Division of Empl. Sec., 13 N.J. 431, 100 A.2d 287 (1953);
Krauss v. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 100 A.2d 277 (1953). Of course,
the correlation of the various statutory systems providing for protection
against wage-loss from specified causes (employment-connected disability,
non-industrial disability or unemployment) creates similar problems of cor-
relation. See particularly California Comp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
128 ACA 916, 276 P.2d 148 (Dist. Ct. Cal. 1954).
20. See Daugherty, Employment Stability and Income Security, 274 AN!
NALS 39, 40 (1951); Reuther, Practical Aims and Purposes of American
Labor, 274 ANNALS 64, 70 (1951).
21. The starting point for a serious investigation of the whole area of inter-
relation between guaranteed wages and unemployment compensation is the
monumental report to the President by the Advisory Board, Office of War
Mobilization and Reconversion, compiled under the direction of the late
Murray Latimer, Guaranteed Wages, especially at 101 ff. (1947), and the
auxiliary report, Economic Analysis of Guaranteed Wages, by Professors
Hansen and Samuelson, ibid, appendix F, especially at 455. The topic is treated
in the present symposium. Eberling, The Guaranteed Annual Wage and
Unemployment Compensation, infra at 458. For further views on and studies
of this point see Schmidt, Private Guaranteed Wages and Unemployment
Compensation Supplementation, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING,
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 96 (1954); Papier, Guaranteed
Annual Wage Proposals: Their Implications for Unemployment Compensation,
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siderations not entirely depending on purely economic determina-
tions.
Pension, welfare and guaranteed wage plans are said to have many
inherent or incidental drawbacks. The most serious of them is their
effect on labor mobility and vice versa.23 Accelerated vesting formulae
in pension schemes and multi-employer plans24 have improved the
situation, but still leave vast segments of workers unprotected. As a
result it seems to be admitted that there is a need for a general legis-
lative social security scheme, to which contractual pension and wel-
fare benefits and wage guarantees are merely supplementary.
b. What Type of Legislative Social Security System: Public Assist-
ance, Pensions or Social Insurance?.
It has become conventional2 to differentiate between three basic
types of legislative social security systems, usually designated as Social
Insurance, Public Assistance, and Universal Pensions programs. Ac-
tually, however, this classification is by no means based on simple and
unequivocal criteria and the lines which divide the three categories
are blurred and meandering. Recent critics of the whole structure of
the American welfare system have emphatically voiced the thesis
that the characteristics commonly attributed to public assistance and
social insurance are not inherent and indispensable but incidental and
8 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 265 (1955). For the current status, see U.S. BUREAU OF
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DEP'T OF LABOR, GUARANTEED ANNUAL WAGE PAYMENTS
AND RELATED EMPLOYER PAYMENTS UNDER STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
SYSTEMs (mimeo. 1953); U.S. BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DEPT OF
LABOR, GUARANTEED WAGE AND RELATED PAYMENTS, How TREATED UNDER STATE
U. I. SYSTEMS, THE LABOR MARKET AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 27 (April 1954);
Booth, Discussion of the paper by Schmidt (supra), PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH
ANNUAL MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH AssOcIATION 113 (1954).
22. Of course the expression "purely economic" has to be taken with a grain
of salt. The whole recent doctrinal controversy about the legitimacy, useful-
ness and content of "Welfare Economics" as a separate branch of economic
science has especially significant repercussions on the function of economic
analysis in the context of shaping the "best" or "proper" social security
systems. See in this connection the discussions by SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS
OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 203 ff. (1948); REDER, STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF WEL-
FARE ECONOMICS (1947); Boulding, Welfare Economics in 2 A SURVEY OF
CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 1 (Haley ed. 1951); Zeuthen, Recent Developments
in Economics, 68. Q.J. EcoN. 159, 168 (1954); Bergson, On The Concept of Social
Welfare, 68 Q.J. EcoN. 159, 233 (1954).
23. See especially PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, op. cit. supra note 5, at
45; Shishkin, Some Problems of Annual Wage Guarantees, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH Ass'N., Publication
No. 12, 84, 93 (1954).
24. For an examination of 300 pension plans, including 45 multi-employer
plans, with respect to their vesting formulae and their relationship to labor
mobility see Rowe and Paine, Pension Plans under Collective Bargaining,
76 MONTH. LAB. REV. 237 (1953).
25. See, e.g. MERRIAM, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING, 8, 9 (Federal Security
Agency, Social Security Administration, Div. of Res. & Statistics, Bureau Rep.
No. 17 1952).
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interchangeable. 2 Moreover, the vindictive and disgusting grilling to
which the Curtis Committee 27 subjected28 the former Commissioner of
Social Security because of his interpretation of the concept of social
insurance has demonstrated with clarity that the traditional label is
open to misunderstandings and a veritable invitation to semantic con-
troversies. 29
Without claiming immutable scientific accuracy it might broadly be
stated that public assistance programs provide benefits according to
individual and demonstrated budgetary "needs" and are usually fi-
nanced from so-called general revenues, i.e., tax impositions of the
direct or excise type without particular connection between the class
of taxpayers or transactions bearing the burden and the class of re-
cipients benefited by the program. Social insurance, on the other
hand, is characterized by benefits which are payable without proof
of need and is usually financed, at least in part, by either the prospec-
tive beneficiaries themselves or a class of taxpayers upon whom these
beneficiaries are economically dependent or both, according to schedules
predicated upon actuarial considerations. Frequently, though not com-
monly, social insurance benefits are not of a fiat-rate type but gradu-
ated according to the past economic status of the recipients. Pensions,
finally, in many respects take a middle-ground between social insur-
ance and public assistance. Like the former category of social security
schemes they are payable independent of need, while they resemble
the latter category of welfare systems in being financed from general
revenues on a pay-as-you-go basis. -Usually pensions are of the flat
benefit type.
Historically public assistance came first and dominated the scene
for a period of nearly three hundred years.30 But during the second
part of the nineteenth century the idea of social insurance was de-
veloped, especially in Germany, for the purpose of devising a more ef-
26. TenBroek and Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance-A Norma-
tive Evaluation, 1 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 237, 245-51 (1954).
27. The Curtis Committee was established as a subcommittee by the Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives. by resolution of Feb-
ruary 20, 1953, "to investigate those aspects of the American social security
laws concerned with the aged." On May 21, 1953, its task was broadened and it
was instructed "to conduct through studies and investigations of all matters
pertaining to our social security laws," CONG. REC. 83d Cong. 1st Sess. A, 4815
(1953). The Hearings were published under the title ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM (1953).
28. ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, op. cit. supra note 27, at part
6, 879 ff. (1953).
29. See Burns, Private and Social Insurance And the Problem of Social
Security, 28 CANADIAN WELFARE, No. 7, 5 ff., id. No. 8, at 9 ff. (1953); Stack,
The Meaning of Social Security, 23 J. CoMP. LEG. & INT'L L. 113, 125 (3d ser.
1941).
30. For a succinct history of public assistance see RIESENFELD AND MAXWELL,
MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 685 (1950).
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fective palliative against the threatening class struggle.31 German
scholars, of course, recognized quickly that social insurance was not
analogous to insurance based on a private contract, but was insurance
only in a broad generic sense.m Institution and nomenclature were
quickly copied by other countries. In the United States the idea of
social insurance made slow progress at first, remaining confined to the
field of workmen's compensation.m But in 1935 the architects of the
new American economic security system extended the domain of social
insurance to old age and unemployment, adding not long thereafter,
premature death. They designed a two-legged structure, allocating the
principal and dominant responsibility for income maintenance to
social insurance, but leaving subsidiary and supplementary protection
to public assistance. They recognized that old age insurance, because
of politically advisable limitations, would, for a period to come, be
neither universal nor "matured" and that unemployment insurance
could only be planned as a transitional maintenance source with the
result that public assistance, whether "categorical" or "general,"
would have to take care of the residual needs. Old age insurance as
established provided for graduated benefits and was financed on a
contributory and a limited reserve fund basis by means of employment
taxes imposed on wage-earners and employers. Unemployment in-
surance was likewise financed on a reserve fund basis by means of em-
ployment taxes; but the choice between flat rate or scaled benefits and
the contributory or non-contributory financing system was left to the
states.
Despite many and important subsequent modifications, the basic
structure of American social security has kept its basic original fea-
tures until today. However, in the course of time increasing criticism
has been directed against it, not only with reference to details, but
against its fundamental conception and organization. Spokesmen of
business, 34 pension politicians of various hues,3 and academic welfare
31. For the origin and development of social insurance in Germany see
Lass, Soziales Versicherungsrecht in 4 HOLTZENDORFF-KOHLER, ENZYKLOPADIE
DER RECHTSWISSENScHsrFT 459 (7th ed. 1914).
32. See Lass, supra note 31, at 466.
33. For a history of workmen's compensation in the United States, see
RIESENFELD AND MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGIsLATioN 127 (1950).
34. See especially in this connection the testimony of the spokesman for the
Chamber of Commerce in Social Security Amendments of 1954, Hearings
before Senate Commitee on Finance on H.R. 9366, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 484
(1954) and in Social Security Amendments of 1954, Hearings before House
Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 7199, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 800 (1954).
The National Association of Manufacturers, however, endorsed the existing
system. Hearings before Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 9366, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 564 (1954); Hearings before House Committee on Ways and Means
on H.R. 7199, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 178 (1954).
35. See especially the testimony of the spokesman for the Townsend Plan,
Social Security Amendments of 1954, Hearings before Senate Committee on
Finance on H.R. 9366, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 371 (1954) and in Social Security
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experts6 have joined this chorus.37 But while these critics are in
consonance on the undesirability of a system which "dishes out doles
on two counters" and the "fictiousness" and "fiscal unsoundness" of
reserve fund financing, however limited, they part ways beyond this
area of agreement. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States
does not endorse flat rate benefits and advocates retention of present
financing methods for an artificially "matured"38 system by means of
employment taxes on the "earning basis"-thereby, of course, shifting
the burden otherwise borne by public assistance from the geieral tax
base to the lower brackets of payrolls and self-employment income.39
The pension advocates conversely attack the financing by means of
employment taxes as "regressive" and urge flat rate benefits inde-
pendent of former earnings or need, financed by progressive taxes
on gross receipts and gross income in excess of certain exemptions.
40
It is obvious that the framing of the most appropriate social security
system involves extremely difficult judgments of social policy. As
two scholars at the University of California have argued recently, the
standards of such judgments should be drawn from the fields of
political science, economics and psychology.41 Unfortunately, however,
the tragic truth seems to be that, at least for the present, these sciences
are unable to supply the needed yardsticks.
Perhaps the logical starting point in drawing the ideal blueprint
should be the determination of the appropriate benefit type. For the
choice between fiat rate and graduated benefits seems to affect the
applicable financing methods.42 Professors tenBroek and Wilson re-
Amendment of 1954, Hearings before House Committee on Ways and Means
on H.R. 7199, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 545 (1954).
36. The most detailed attack from the ranks of academic critics is tenBroek
and Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance-A Normative Evaluation,
1 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 237 (1954).
37. Labor's view has been friendly toward the basic philosophies of the
present system, Cruikshank, Some Labor Views on the Social Security Pro-
gram, Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Meeting, Industrial Relations Research
Ass'n., Publication No. 12, 183 (1954).
38. For a good general discussion of the concept of "maturing" the system
by "blanketing in" non-covered members of the present aged population
consult PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, Op. cit. supra note 5, at 64 ff.; see also
SOCIAL SECUITY FINANCING, op. cit. supra note 25, at 23 and the testimony of
Assistant Secretary Perkins, Hearings before House Committee on Ways and
Means on. H.R. 7199, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1954).
39. Statement of A. D. Marshall, U. S. Chamber of Commerce, Hearings
before Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 9366, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 484
(1954).
40. For a forceful exposition of this view see especially tenBroek and Wilson,
Public Assistance and Social Insurance - A Normative Evaluation, 1 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 237 (1954), and the testimony of the spokesman for the Townsend
Plan, loc. cit. supra, note 35.
41. TenBroek and Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance -A
Normative Evaluation, 1 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 237 (1954).
42. Cf. the observations to this effect by MERRIAM, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANC-
ING, op. cit. supra note 25, at 13.
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cently have risen as apostles of the principle of equality and em-
phatically asserted that this ideal, emblazoned on the American creed,
is violated by such "excessive individualization" as is reflected in
scaled benefits and "means test."4 3 But it is dubious whether American
democracy is really so imbued with egalitarianism as to be inconsis-
tent with differentiation, based on previous economic status, in public
income maintenance schemes. Even in the Soviet Union the present
stage of socialism in the evolution toward communism has necessitated
the retention of sharp differences in social insurance benefits in order
to assure the achievement of the over-all goals of social planning.
44
If American social security had the sole purpose of guaranteeing
a subsistence-level standard of living, i.e., a "national minimum" as it
was advocated in the United Kingdom,45 a good case for universal
flat rates could be made. But that branch of the structure which is
called social insurance is designed to do both more and less than
that. It has the purpose of bridging the gap between the periods with
and without earnings and, accordingly, should be related to previous
income levels. It may, therefore, in exceptional cases provide for
benefits which need supplementation by other parts of the whole
social security system. Of course, if these exceptions become the rule
the whole arrangement becomes a farce.
46
Against the background of graduated benefits and a supplementary,
progressively financed public assistance system the bugaboo of re-
gressive taxation as a financing method for social insurance should no
longer be such a terrifying apparition. Critics of payroll tax financing
have inveighed against this method on the ground of regressiveness,
both as far as the employee's and as far as the employer's shares are
concerned. Even if it be conceded-and some recent writers have
demonstrated that the matter rests ultimately on the quicksand of
political value judgments47-that government expenditures generally
43. TenBroek and Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance -A
Normative Evaluation, 1 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 237, 259, 265, 301 (1954).
44. ALEXANDROW, LEHRBUCH DES SOWJETISCHEN ARBEITSRECHTS (German trans-
lation bei Werner) 300 (1952). As Professor Alexandrow points out the pivotal
norm of the Russian system is the principle, enshrined in art. 12 of the Stalin
constitution: "To each according to his merits."
45. In Social Insurance and Allied Services, Report by Sir William Beveridge
(CMD. No. 6404, §§ 8, 17, 303, 304 (1942), establishment of a "national minimum"
through a "flat rate of subsistence benefit" was outlined as one of the corner
stones of the new system. Actually, however, the National Insurance Act,
1946, did not relate benefits to subsistence as it was considered impossible to
have a general level which excluded need for some kind of supplementation.
See the detailed discussion in Report of the Committee on the Economic and
Financial Problems of the Provision for Old Age, CMD. No. 9333, § 203 (1954).
46. In February, 1954, of the 4.8 million aged persons drawing OASI bene-
fits, 460,000 received supplementary OAA payments, WHITE, CONCURRENT RE-
CEIPT or PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND OLD AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE, 17 SOCIAL
SECURITY BULLETIN, 8, 12 (1954).
47. See Kalven and Blum, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U.
OF CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952); see also the remarks by Tucker, Rebuttal, 5 NAT.
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should be financed by progressive taxation, it is highly questionable
whether the attribute "regressive" is appropriate for exactions which
are collected from wage-earners or self-employed for the purpose of
assuring them a deferred income commensurate with, or in excess of,
the aggregate of their contributions, especially where the benefits, by
reason of a statutory floor and the applicable computation formulae
are weighted heavily in favor of the lower income brackets.
48
The case of the employers' contributions presents greater complexities,
for the reason that a large portion of the amounts so collected is now
calculated to finance benefits for the groups which get a "free ride"
under the blanketing-in policies and because of the likelihood that
such burden be passed on in full or in greater part to the consumer.
49
In view, however, of the great difficulties and doubts which pervade
the analysis of the "real" tax burden distribution in the field of
social security taxes, the danger of regressiveness in the financing
of the long term benefit side of the whole structure cannot be recog-
nized as a cardinal sin thereof.
As a result, the conclusion seems to be permissible that from the
vantage point of general philosophical and political value judgments
the retention of the basic features of the existing social insurance
system can well be defended. A graduated benefit arrangement which
is financed as to its long term disbursements-at least in part-by
the beneficiaries themselves and possesses demonstrable interrelation
between benefits, past earnings and contributions paid in proportion
thereto, not only gives the protected classes a greater feeling of se-
curity, but is in fact less susceptible to tampering by political pressure
groups. Even in the United Kingdom a recent royal commission has
defended the "contributory principle" because of its character as "an
important measure of social discipline. '50 Of course, the whole edifice,
though sound in its design, might still be doomed to collapse as a
result of the pressures stemming from the general inflationary forces
in our economy.
TAX J., 36, 38 (1952).
48. For recent discussions of the question as to whether the employees' share
of the payroll tax is really borne by them or shifted to consumers at large and
whether, if borne by the wage earners, is comparable to taxes collected for
general government expenditures see Tucker, Distribution of Tax Burdens in
1948, 4 NAT. TAX J. 269, 276 (1951); Musgrave and Frane, Rejoinder to Dr.
Tucker, 5 NAT. TAX J. 15, 24, 30 (1952).
49. For the difficulties flowing from the theories of shifting and incidence of
the employers' share of the payroll taxes consult Tucker, Distribution of Tax
Burdens in 1948, 4 NAT. TAX J. 269, 275 (1951); Musgrave and Frane, supra
note 48, at 30. Consult also the testimony by Asst. Secretary Perkins, Social
Security Act Amendments of 1954, Hearings before House Committee on Ways
and Means, on H.R. 7199, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1954).
50. Report of the Committee on the Economic and Financial Problems of the
Provision for Old Age CMD. No. 9333 § 167 (1954). For a recent American de-
fense of the contributory principle see Willcox, The Contributory Principle




The American social security planner will find little comfort and
probably little guidance from the fact that at present status and fate
of social insurance against old age are an object of grave concern and
the center of a great controversy also in the United Kingdom.5 1
Though the British system possesses a tripartite character, i.e., is
financed by means of contributions from employees, employers and
the Exchequer (representing, of course, the general taxpayer), it has
so far been based on the so-called "actuarial" or "age 16 contribution"
principle which envisages that the contributions paid by, and in re-
spect to, a worker who is under the system during his working life
should cover his expected benefits.5 Whether, however, this system
should and can be maintained in view of the repeated benefit adjust-
ments necessitated by the steadily rising level of the cost of living
is one of the grave questions which the people of the United Kingdom
and Parliament in particular must answer in the near future.
c. What -Type of Legislative Social Security System: Diversified
or Unitarian?
As Arthur Larson has said so succinctly: "The two great exigencies
that interrupt earning power are loss of physical [or psychological]
capacity to work and loss of economic opportunity to work."53 Age
may produce either of these two misfortunes, because in some in-
stances it may deprive the elderly person of his actual capacity to work,
while in others it may force him into retirement because of standard
hiring and employment policies. This illustration shows that actually
there is no sharp division between the physical and the market side
of the earning capacity but that there is a fluctuating degree of interde-
pendence. In addition modern society has taken the attitude that at
a certain age or after a certain length of employment the citizen has
a right to retire and that it is a governmental function to provide
income maintenance schemes enabling him to do so without becoming
destitute.
The foremost test that an effective social security system ought to
meet is comprehensiveness and universality, i.e., that it covers all mem-
bers of the community and all risks which cause destitution. Of
course, speaking in broadest terms, American social security has pos-
sessed these attributes for more than two centuries; for general as-
51. See in this connection especially the detailed and illuminating inquiry
by the Royal Commission appointed in July 1953 (so-called Phillips Commit-
.tee). Report of the Committee on the Economic and Financial Problems of
the Provision for Old Age, Cm _. No. 9333 (1954); the editorial Pensions in
Perspective, THE ECONOMIST, 883 (Dec. 11, 1954) and Lord Beveridge, The
Welfare Concept: Government's Role Re-examined (National Industrial
Conference Board mimeo. 1954).
52. For details see Report of the Committee on the Economic and Financial
Problems of the Provision for Old Age, CMD. No. 9333 § 149-173 (1954).
53. 2 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 484 (1952).
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sistance as administered under the poor laws did not discriminate be-
tween various hazards of destitution and was available in emergency
cases even to paupers without settlement.54 An entirely different mat-
ter, however, is brought up when it comes to the question of whether
social insurance as such should be universal and comprehensive. Amer-
ican social insurance has grown haphazardly and with sharp risk
differentiation. Industrial accident, occupational disease, old age, un-
employment and premature death have been the hazards which step
by step have found social insurance coverage under a variety of ar-
rangements. Long term disability (invalidity) resulting from non-
industrial causes, however, has been sneaked within this wall of pro-
tection only in a surreptitious and limited fashion 55 and nonemploy-
ment connected short term disability (sickness) has fared better in
only four states, and there with widely different methods.56 Moreover,
only the wage-loss incident of such short-term disability is taken care
of; the medical cost aspect is left to public assistance.
There is no question that there are strong forces striving to extend
social insurance to income maintenance caused by whatever risk, al-
though the resistance to coverage of medical cost, outside the existing
one under workmen's compensation, is unfortunately still very pro-
nounced, despite a movement of long standing advocating compulsory
insurance protection.5 7 Of course, the trend toward comprehensiveness
raises the problem of whether and to what extent a retention of the ex-
isting diversification of programs is necessary or advisable and to what
extent unification should be accomplished. Such unification would en-
compass not only administration and financing methods but also,
within limits, benefit levels. Again, difficult policy judgments have to
be made. On the one hand, it appears plausible that the need for in-
come maintenance is identical regardless of what risk has produced the
loss of earnings. On the other hand, it could very well be argued that
long term risks, such as old age and invalidity, require a different main-
54. For details see RIESENFELD AND MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION
716 ff. (1950).
55. The Social Security Amendments of 1954 provide for the preservation of
insurance rights under Old-Age and Survivors Insurance of individuals with
extended total disability, Pub. L. No. 761, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 106 (1954).
56. In California, Rhode Island and New Jersey the temporary disability in-
surance programs are structurally similar to and coordinated with unemploy-
ment insurance; in New York temporary disability insurance is framed along
the lines of workmen's compensation and administered by the Workmen's
Compensation Board. For a survey of the three programs which are handled
similarly to unemployment insurance, see U. S. BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECUR-
ITY, DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT LAWS AS OF AUGUST
1954 119 (1954). Guidance in the framing of appropriate legislation can be
gained from U.S. BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DEP'T OF LABOR, TEMPO-
RARY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROBLEMS IN FORMULATING A PROGRAM ADMINIS-
TERED BY A STATE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AGENCY (revised 1953). For an excel-
lent study covering the scope of existing protection in one state, consult REPORT
ON A STUDY OF SICKNESS AND DISABILITY INSURANCE (State of Minnesota 1954).
57. For a brief survey consult Hamovitch, History of the Movement for




tenance level than short term risks, such as unemployment and sick-
ness. Immediately, of course, the acceptance of such differentiation
spawns a new dilemma, because now the problem arises of whether
such short term benefits should be higher than the long term pay-
ments, because of the interest in avoiding unnecessary temporary
disturbances in "economic status, or lower, because of the greater
capacity of the gainfully employed to absorb the effects of short term
interruptions. Moreover, the benefits for industrial accidents and
diseases could be thought to deserve particular liberality because there
the loss of earning capacity is sustained as a direct result of participa-
tion in the productive process. Foreign systems have carried the idea
of unity and uniformity to a remarkable degree, but apparently no
existing system has become completely unitarian. Apart from the
short-lived experiment with Einheitsversicherung in Berlin the social
security system of New Zealand is perhaps the best-known example
of an arrangement aiming at uniformity.58 But even there unemploy-
ment and sickness cash benefits are different from the pensions pay-
able to the aged or invalids. In addition workmen's compensation has
a system completely apart from the other social security branches.
Similarly in the United Kingdom, which on the insurance benefit
side has adopted an even higher degree of parity among the disburse-
ments than New Zealand, industrial accident insurance has been kept
separate from the other branches of the National Insurance System
as to benefit levels and computations, following the recommendations
to that effect by Lord Beveridge.5 9
Of course, even in so far as unification might be desirable on gen-
eral welfare principles, its realization would present considerable
difficulties in the United States because of reasons flowing from his-
torical development and the federal structure. Without doubt in-
validity wage-loss insurance could easily and should be added to, and
unified with, old age and survivors insurance; but the status of sick-
ness wage-loss insurance will of necessity be determined by the fate
of workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance. Currently
the United States is blessed with 55 separate and widely divergent
workmen's compensation systems60 and at least 54 different unem-
ployment insurance setups.61 Whether the disparity in living standards
58. More detailed information about the New Zealand system can be
gathered from INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, SYSTEMS OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
NEW ZEALAND (1949); McHenry, The New Zealand System of Social Security,
25 SOCIAL SERVICE REV. 48 (1951).
59. Social Insurance and Allied Services, Report by Sir William Beveridge,
CMD. No. 6404 (1942).
60. For details see Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for In-
dustrial Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 531 (1954).
61. Unemployment insurance systems exist in the 48 states, the District of
Columbia, Alaska and Hawaii; Puerto Rico possesses a limited system for em-
ployees of the sugar industry provided for by Act. No. 356 of May 15, 1948
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and costs in various parts of the country and the dangers of bureau-
cratic concentration in Washington necessitate or, at least, justify
such diversification is a hard question to answer. Again value and
policy judgments are involved which defy scientific solution. Certainly
the present system has led to great variations in benefit scales and
difficulties in case of multi-state employment. Moreover, it has pre-
vented effective supervision of workmen's compensation insurance
rates especially in regard to carrier expenses and non-premium income,
such as receipts from subrogation claims and investment returns.62
II.
THE ROLE OF UNEMPLOYAENT INSURANCE
IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ATYERICAN SocIAL INSURANCE
a. Basic Patterns and Policies
Since the American free enterprise economy is not subject to com-
plete regimentation of all levels and phases of the productive process,
the labor market undergoes shifts and fluctuations which may make
it impossible for members of the labor force to find gainful employ-
ment. As a result, in contrast to the USSR which boasts of no un-
employment,63 social insurance against unemployment is a needed
integral part of the American social security system. But while the
broad objectives of this protection are self-evident, its contours are
blurred and many of even its basic policies are wavering and con-
troversial. 64
Actually unemployment insurance provides for an area of protec-
tion of only moderate dimensions. The limitations of the system apply
to the class of persons having insured status, to the types of unemploy-
ment covered, and to the duration and amount of benefits. Unemployed
persons who do not qualify for benefits, have exhausted their rights,
or do not draw adequate payments, have to rely for their maintenance
on general relief or, in appropriate cases and within the applicable
limits, on the new categorical federal assistance program for veterans.65
establishing Employment Security in the sugar industry, as amended by Act.
No. 126 of July 1, 1953. In addition, federal legislation has established a
separate system for railroad employees, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 351 et. seq. (1954) and a"meshed-in" system for the federal employees, Pub. L. No. 767 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. § 4 (1954) (adding a new title XV to the Social Security Act).
62. See Riesenfeld, supra note 60, at 558 with further references.
63. See Alexandrow, op. cit. supra note 44.
64. For the gradual growth of an "agreed body of principles" concerning
the basic objectives of unemployment insurance, see U. S. BUREAU OF EMPLOY-
MENT SECURITY, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SERVICE, DEP'T OF LABOR, ADEQUACY
OF BENEFITS UNDER UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE Foreword (1952).
65. Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, 66 STAT. 663, §§ 401 ff.
While the act provides for coordination with the administration of state unem-
ployment insurance programs it applies also to Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands. Id. § 402 (d). For further details see Bofferding, Unemployment Corn-
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(1) Limitations as to the class of persons insured. Unemployment
insurance benefits are not available to all classes of persons seeking
employment who are not able to find work. The system protects only
job seekers who are already and genuinely attached to the labor force
and belong to covered occupations. Thus newcomers to the labor market
are excluded, with the exception of veterans who enjoy the special
protection of the Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 195266 be-
cause they might have gone into the service directly from school. In
that respect American law is less liberal than, for instance, the law
of New Zealand where even new entrants into the labor market who
have reached the age of sixteen are entitled to unemployment insur-
ance benefits if they cannot find suitable employment. 7 There is like-
wise widespread agreement that merely temporary, transitional or cas-
ual affiliation with the labor force does not suffice for the acquisition of
insured status and that more substantial connection is to be looked for.68
As a result all jurisdictions require that an individual, to be entitled
to benefits, must have earned a specified amount of wages or must have
worked for a specified period of time, or both, within a "critical"
period preceding his claim, the so-called "base period." There is con-
siderable variation in the different state laws, with reference to
the determination of both the past period figuring as base period69 and
the past employment experience in terms of wages, duration or a com-
bination thereof accumulated in such period as is necessary to fulfill
the qualifying requirements. 0 Moreover, a number of states provide
for, or authorize administrative establishment of, special qualifying
requirements of seasonal workers.
71
pensation for Veterans, 20 EMPLOYMENT SECURITY REV., No. 2, p. 20 (1953).
Reticker, Unemployment Compensation for Veterans, 21 EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
REv., No. 2, p. 42 (1954); Pagan de Col6n, Our Experience with an Unemplov-
ment Compensation Program, 21 EMPLOYMENT SECURITY REV., No. 2, p. 45
(1954).
66. See note 64 supra.
67. New Zealand, Social Security Act, 1938, as amended, 2 NEw ZEALAND
STATS. 1257, 1284, § 51 (1948).
68. For a good discussion of the criteria and policies which should apply to
the insured-status requirements see U.S. BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SERVIcE, DEP'T OF LABOR, ADEQUACY OF BENEFITS
UNDER EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 3-7 (1952).
69. For details see U.S. BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DEP'T OF LABOR,
COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAwS AS OF AUGUST 1954
47 (1954).
70. For details see id. at 48 if.
71. The employment security laws of sixteen states contain special provisions
with respect to seasonal industries. Two of these laws specify expressly
separate attachment tests for seasonal workers. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2366
(75a) (1949); WIs. STAT. § 108.04(4) Cc) (1945), as amended by Wis. Laws
1953, c. 208. Eight acts authorize the administrative agency in charge of the
administration to lay down special attachment tests if thought to be ap-
propriate. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 210 C (1940); ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 56-1003c(c)
(Supp. 1951); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1104(g),(4) (1947); GA. UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION LAW, § 3 (e) (3), as amended by Ga. Laws Ex. Sess. 1937, No.
238, and Ga. Laws 1941, No. 188, § 4; ME. REV. STAT. c. 29, § 21 II (1954);
OHIO REV. CODE § 4141.33(A) (Baldwin 1954); S. C. CODE § 68-111 (1952);
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In addition, state employment security laws bar a substantial num-
ber of current members of the labor force from compulsory 72 unem-
ployment insurance coverage because of either the type of employ-
ment in which they are engaged or the insufficient size of the firm by
which they are employed. The most prevalent occupational exclusions
relate to agricultural employees, domestic workers in private homes
and state and local employees.7 3 The current maximum size-of-firm
exemption excludes firms with less than four employees. Since the
recent amendments74 of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act75 have
reduced the federal exemption from firms with less than eight em-
ployees to firms with less than four employees, the 25 states which
previously have exempted either all or some firms with less than
eight but more than four employees76 are bound to follow suit either
by virtue of the parallel coverage clauses in their statutes77 or through
special amendment.7 8 A substantial group of states, however, accords
even broader coverage by either having no size-of-firm exemption
whatsoever 79 or exempting only firms with less than three employees.
80
Yet the position of Congress that the coverage of smaller firms is "an
VT. REV. STAT. § 5376 (1947). Five acts neither specify nor authorize special
rules for the qualifying requirements of seasonal workers, but employ different
benefit formulae. COLO. REV. STAT. § 82-4-4 (1953); MINN. STAT. § 268.04 subd.
26 (1949); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 96-16(f)' (Supp. 1953); ORE. REV. STAT. § 657.245
(1953); VA. CODE § 60-46.5 (1950). In Michigan, finally, only the employers'
contributions are regulated separately for seasonal industries. MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 421.21a (1948).
72. All states, except Alabama, Massachusetts, New York and Vermont,
authorize voluntary coverage of excluded employments at the election of the
employer. U. S. BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARI-
SON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS AS OF AUGUST 1954 13 (1954).
For the model form of the elective coverage clause, see U.S. BUREAU OF EM-
PLOYMENT SECURITY, DEP'T OF LABOR, MANUAL OF STATE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
LEGISLATION § 7(f) (rev. Sept. 1950).
73. Only the District of Columbia, in view of its urban character, omits
the exclusion of agricultural workers; New York is the only state to provide
for compulsory coverage of domestic workers in private homes. Some states
have compulsory coverage of either state or certain types of local public
employees or both. For details see COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT IN-
SURANCE LAWS AS OF AUGUST 1954, op. cit. supra note 72, at 9, 11, 12. It is
estimated that the exclusion of state and local government workers affects
approximately 4.3 million individuals, the exclusion of agricultural and do-
mestic workers approximately 4.7 million workers. See U.S. BUREAU OF EM-
PLOYMENT SECURITY, DEP'T OF LABOR, SOURCE, NATURE AND LIMITATIONS OF IN-
SURED UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS, THE LABOR MARKET AND EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY 21 (April 1954).
74. Pub. L. No. 767, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. c. 1212 (Sept. 1, 1954).
75. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, C. 23, § 3306 (a).
76. The amendment of the federal law affects the employment security acts
of 25 states; see the table in COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
LAWS AS OF AUGUST 1954, op. cit. supra note 72, at 2.
77. Such clauses exist in all but three of the 25 states affected; see table
in COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS AS OF AUGUST 1954,
op. cit. supra note 72, at 5.
78. Such amendment is apparently needed in three states (Colorado, Michi-
gan, South Carolina).
79. Fifteen jurisdictions; see table in COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE LAWS AS OF AUGUST 1954, op. cit. supra note 72, at 2.
80. Ibid. (two jurisdictions).
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area where differences in state and local conditions become a sig-
nificant factor"81 and that "[t]here is a twilight zone where needed
flexibility can only be maintained through State action"82 tends to
perpetuate the exclusion of nearly 2,000,000 workers.
83
It is also important that unemployment insurance is available only
to employees and not to self-employed workers. As in other branches
of social legislation, the appropriate test for the decision of whether
or not an employment relation is present has created doubts and con-
troversies.84 The Federal Unemployment Tax Act still bears the form
which the 80th Congress imprinted thereon with the passage of the
celebrated Status Quo Law85 and requires determination according, to
the "usual common law rules."86 The state statutes vary a good deal in
their characterization of the requisite employment relationship.
8 7
Twenty-five of the states employ the so-called "ABC"-test, which-pat-
terned after the Wisconsin law8-was incorporated into the 1937
version of the model bill of an unemployment insurance act, prepared
by the Social Security Board to aid the states in the enactment of un-
employment insurance acts. 89 This test which declares services per-
formed by an individual for wages to be employment unless a three-
branched exclusionary test90 is met is thought to embody a broader
and more liberal concept of what constitutes employment than the one
81. Extending and Improving the Unemployment Compensation Program,
SEN. REP. No. 1794, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1954).
82. Ibid.
83. Hearings before House Committee on Ways and Means on HR. 6537, 6539,
7054, 8857, and 8585, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1954).
84. For an excellent survey of the status of the question until 1945 see
Asia, Employment Relation: Common-Law Concept and Legislative Definition,
55 YALE L.J. 76 (1945).
85. Pub. L. No. 642, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 STAT. 438 (June 14, 1948). For
details see RIESENFELD AND MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 34 (1950).
86. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 3306 (i) : "For purposes of this chapter, the term'employee' includes an officer of a corporation, but such term does not in-
clude-
(1) any individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable
in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of
an independent contractor, or
(2) any individual (except an officer of a corporation) who is not an
employee under such common law rules."
87. See the table in COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS
AS OF AUGUST 1954, op. cit. supra note 72 at 7.
88. Wis. Laws 1935 c. 192, § 5.
89. For details see Asia, supra note 84, at 82 et seq.; RIESENFELD AND MAX-
WELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION, 524, 525 (1950).
90. The exclusionary test requires that
"(A) such individual has been and will continue to be free from control
or direction over the performance of such service both under his
contract and in fact, and
(B) such service is either outside the usual course of the business for
which such service is performed or that such service is performed
outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which
such service is performed; and
(C) such individual is customarily engaged in an independently estab-
lished trade, occupation, profession or business."
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recognized by the common law.91 But even in states where no such leg-
islative mandate is available, the majority of courts have endeavored to
apply the common law rules in the spirit of social welfare.92
2. Limitations as to the types of unemployment covered. Unemploy-
ment insurance does not cover all types of income maintenance needs
caused by joblessness. The system is not designed to include unem-
ployment for other causes than those resulting from labor market con-
ditions, i.e., industrial unemployment. 93 Wage loss due to psychological
or physiological disability is left to separate provision, existing only
in a few jurisdictions.94 Some states provide, however, that physical
disability due to sickness occurring during a period of unemployment
shall not impair benefit rights if no suitable job was available during
such interval.95
Traditional theory classified unemployment according to its causes
into four principal types: casual, seasonal, cyclical and technological.96
Modern researches by economists, especially labor economists and in-
dustrial relations specialists, however, have revealed that this analysis
is incomplete, inadequate and, at least in some respects, fallacious.97
In the first place, it is now recognized that the effect of technological
advances on employment opportunities is an extremely complex mat-
ter which defies reduction to a simple generalization.98 In the second
place, the enumeration fails properly to account for the fact that a
major source of unemployment lies in what are called labor market
frictions, i.e., conditions which prevent matching of supplies and de-
mands.99 This "frictional unemployment" which is "due to the dif-
ficulty of getting workers and jobs together"'10 0 is present even in
91. For a recent detailed and comprehensive judicial analysis of the ABC
test and its result of making the statutory employment definition more in-
clusive than the master and servant relation see Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp.
v. Rauch, 1 Ill.2d 328, 115 N.E.2d 898 (1953); but see Commonwealth Life &
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Board of Review, 414 Ill. 475, 111 N.E.2d 345 (1953), applying
to the special exemption for insurance agents.
92. See e.g., Sudduth v. California Emp. Stab. Com., 130 ACA 355 (1955).
93. See RIESENFELD AND MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 465 (1950).
94. See supra p. 229.
95. Idaho, Md., Mont., Nev., Tenn., Vt. See COMPARISON OF STATE UNEM-
PLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS AS OF AUGUST 1954 op. cit. supra note 72, at 75.
96. See RIESENFELD AND MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 465 (1950),
with further references.
97. For modern discussions of causes and types of unemployment, see e.g.,
GARBARINO, THE UNEMPLOYED WORKER DURING A PERIOD OF "FULL" EMPLOY-
MENT 1 (Institute of Industrial Relations, Univ. of California Publication No.
50, 1954); LERNER, ECONOMICS OF EMPLOYMENT, 19 et seq., 195, 220 (1951),
TAFT, ECONOMICS AND PROBLEMS OF LABOR, 45 et seq., (2d ed. 1948); YODER,
MANPOWER ECONOMICS AND LABOR PROBLEMS, 231 et seq., (3d ed. 1950).
98. For a good discussion and copious references see YODER, op. cit. supra
note 97, at 237 et seq.
99. For a detailed discussion of the concept and incidence of "frictional" or
"normal" unemployment see GARBARINO, op. cit. supra note 97, at 2; LERNER,
op. cit. supra note 97, at 19, 195, 220; TAFT, op. cit. supra note 97, at 46; YODER,
op. cit. stipra note 97, at 244.
100. LERNER, OP. Cit. supra nGte 97, at 19.
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periods of full employment. While from the point of view of the
worker it is characterized by a transitional nature,0 1 it is normal or
permanent if the economy is viewed as a whole. 02 Unfortunately the
area of frictional unemployment lacks sharply defined contours. Ap-
parently it includes short term idleness resulting from technological
changes. 03 According to Professor Lerner it even embraces all types
of unemployment except that resulting from deflationary forces.10 4
Moreover, the cyclical repercussions cut across all categories of un-
employment and shift the boundary between industrial and non-
industrial unemployment. Handicapped or otherwise unemployable
workers might be absorbed by the labor market under extremely
favorable conditions, although "normally" they have no place in the
labor force.
05
It is therefore no surprise that the complex nature of "unemploy-
ment" creates doubts and difficulties regarding the conditions under
which joblessness should entitle the idle worker to compensation bene-
fits. The statutes have tried to tackle the problem by establishment
of a system of special "conditions of eligibility" and "disqualifica-
tions."'0 6 Unfortunately the broad statutory formulae - such as "un-
employed," "able and available," "refusal of suitable work," "voluntary
leaving without good cause" - do not entirely obviate the necessity
of going back to first principles and major objectives and have not in-
frequently induced the courts either to read their own standards of
compensability into the acts107 or to rest their decisions on incidental
technicalities of statutory language. Moreover, the various tests some-
times seem to overlap or conflict in their application to specific situa-
tions and thereby create the danger of arbitrariness.
A few recent cases may serve to illustrate the difficulties inherent in
determining the area of compensable unemployment. In the first
101. See especially GARBARINO, op. cit. supra note 97.
102. See especially LERFa, op. cit. supra note 97, at 19, 195, 220.
103. TAFT, op cit. supra note 97, at 47.
104. LEaNER, op. cit. supra note 97, at 19. According to Lerner frictions
causing unemployment possess either economic or technical character. Tech-
nical frictions exist when the idle workers and the unfilled jobs do not fit
each other because their qualifications, skills and locations do not match;
economic frictions occur because of the effect of labor shortages on wage
scales. Id. at 195, 220.
105. Miller, Unemployment and Unemployability, 7 Am. J. EcoN. AND SOCIAL.
429 (1948).
106. The difference between "ineligibility" and "disqualification" consists
in the legal consequences attendant to these concepts. Ineligibility signifies an
unavailability of benefits because of and for the duration of a condition or
status of the worker; disqualification denotes a postponement or deprivation of
benefits because of a past act, Beaman v. Safeway Stores, 277 P.2d 1010 (Ariz.
1945); Krauss v. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 100 A.2d 277 (1953).
107. See the pertinent criticism of the early inclination of the courts to
place too much weight on the necessity of involuntary unemployment in Har-
rison, Forenote: Statutory Purpose and "Involuntary Unemployment", 55
YALE L.J. 117 (1945).
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place, not even the fact of unemployment is always a simple issue.
In Muchant v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review'0 8 the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania was faced with the problem of whether
a coal miner who was laid off during a slack season was ineligible for
benefits because he spent his time while waiting for employment by
working full time on a farm owned by members of his family, where he
resided and devoted himself to the venture of raising beef cattle. The
court held that the claimant under these circumstances was not un-
employed within the meaning of the act, although he had no current
receipts from his labors.109 Butrthe same court concluded in another
case in which a laid-off miner worked five hours each day in a tap-
room owned and operated by his wife that this activity was not suf-
ficient to detach him from the labor force or the ranks of the un-
employed." 0
Even where it is established that the discharged or temporarily
laid-off employee was not working, his idleness may not be treated as
compensable unemployment because he received remuneration or pay-
ments in lieu of wages specifically allocable to such period. The
most frequent instances are cases involving severance pay"' or vaca-
tion pay.1 2 A number of states make special provisions relating to
this type of fringe benefits." 3 In the absence of a statutory mandate
to the contrary, the receipt of severance or vacation pay not allocable
to a specific period will not affect eligibility or benefit amounts."
4
The same rule applies to terminal disbursement under a profit sharing
plan."5 Special difficulties arise with respect to the effect of retire-
ment pay under -collective bargaining agreements on the unemployed
status of the ex-employee, because the additional problems of "avail-
ability" and "voluntary leaving" present themselves with greater ob-
108. 175 Pa. Super. 85, 103 A.2d 438 (1954).
109. The court cited Phillips v. Michigan Unempl. Comp. Comm', 323 Mich.
188, 35 N.W.2d 237 (1948) in which it was held that a worker in a manu-
facturing plant who was laid off and thereupon tried to resume a former law
practice was not "unemployed" within the meaning of the statute although
his receipts did not exceed his overhead.
110. Martin v..Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 174 Pa. Super. 412, 101
A.2d 421 (1953).
111. Cases collected 25 A.L.R.2d 1070 (1952).
112. Cases collected 30 A.L.R.2d 366 (1953).
113. See the comparative table in COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE LAWS AS OF AUGUST 1954, op cit. supra note 72, at 103.
114. Ackerson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 234 Minn. 271, 48 N.W.2d 338
(1951), 36 MINN. L. REV. 113 (1951); but cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas
Empl. Comm'n, 243 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (relating to severance
pay); Claims of Yeager, 282 App. Div. 604, 125 N.Y.S.2d 537 (3d Dep't 1953);
Claims of Spinella, 282 App. Div. 974, 125 N.Y.S.2d 853 (3d Dep't 1953); Claim
of Marshall, 282 App. Div. 531, 125 N.Y.S.2d 854 (3d Dep't 1953); but see
Shand v. California Empl. Stablization Comm'n, 124 Cal. App. 2d 54, 268 P.2d
193 (1954); Schenley Distillers, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Indiana Empl. Sec.
Div., 112 N.E.2d 299 (Ind. App. 1953) (vacation pay).
115. Kerr v. Director of the Div. of Empl., 123 N.E.2d 299 (Mass. 1954).
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trusiveness." 6 Although at least one jurisdiction has held that such
pension payments bar the right to compensation under the statutory
disqualifying payments clauses, 1 7 other courts have focussed upon
factual particularities, attributing decisive importance to the issues
of availability" 8 or voluntary leaving, or both.119
If the employee is both laid off and receives no payments in lieu of
wages, he still may be denied benefits although he is available for
work and did not actually quit. Cases of this type involve plant
shutdowns for vacation purposes pursuant to collective agreements
which accord vacation pay only upon'attainment of a certain seniority.
While some courts have held that the uncompensated employees are
entitled to benefits under such circumstances,2 0 others have denied
them for the reason that the collective agreement obviates the exist-
ence of involuntary unemployment.' 2'
A realistic explanation for this divergence of judicial opinion lies
in the fact that some judges more than others equate entitlement to
benefits with absolute or comparative meritoriousness of the claim and
feel unsympathetic to claimants who are jobless because they left their
jobs of their own accord or were laid off for reasons not completely
dictated by the market structure.122 These observations are especially
apposite to the cases which involve a more obvious exercise of per-
sonal choice, as, for instance, claims where the unemployment is the
consequence of a relinquishment of a job because of personal dissatis-
faction 123 or where the unemployment persists because of removal
116. Cases collected 32 A.L.R. 2d 901 (1953).
117. Brannigan v. Administrator, Unempl. Comp. Act, 139 Conn. 572, 95 A.2d
798 (1953); Kneeland v. Administrator, Unempl. Comp. Act, 138 Conn. 630,
88 A.2d 376 (1952).
118. Stricklin v. Annunzio, 413 Ill. 324, 109 N.E. 2d 183 (1952); Fleiszig v.
Board of Rev., 412 Ill. 49, 104 N.E.2d 818 (1952); Bennett v. Review Bd. of
Indiana Empl. Sec. Div., 122 Ind. App. 14, 102 N.E.2d 383 (1951); Keystone
Mining Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 167 Pa. Super. 256, 75 A.2d 3
(1950).
119. Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of Rev., 13 N.J. 431, 100 A.287 (1953), 67
HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1954) (compensation granted); Krauss v. Karagheusian
Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 100 A.2d 277 (1953) (compensation denied).
120. Schettino v. Administrator. Unempl. Comp. Act, 138 Conn. 253, 83 A.2d
217 (1951): Glover v. Simmons Co., 31 N.J. Super 308, 106 A.2d 318, cert.
denied, 16 N.J. 206, 108 A.2d 120 (1954); Bennet v. Hix, 79 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va.
1953); accord, Illinois Bd. of Rev. 1953, U. I. BEN. SER. TPU-80.2-25, with ex-
haustive survey of authorities.
121. Beaman v. Bench, 75 Ariz. 345, 256 P.2d 721 (1953); Jackson v.
Minncapo]is-i-Ioneywell Regulator Co., 234 Minn. 52, 47 N.W.2d 449 (1951), 36
MJNw. L. REV. 426 (1952); In re Buffelen Lumber & Mfg. Co., 32 Wash.2d 205,
201 P.2d 194 (1948), but see WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.115 (1952) altering the
rule of this case.
122. See, for example, the judicial emphasis on the function of unemploy-
ment compensation as "social insurance ... against the distress of involuntary
unemployment" and on the need for protection of the fund against persons"who would prefer benefits to suitable jobs" in Krauss v. Karagheusian Inc.,
13 N.J. 447, 100 A.2d 277, 281 (1953).
123. Such reasons for dissatisfaction may range from dangerous and de-
leterious working conditions, Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 219 Minn.
[ VOL. 8
PATTERNS AND POLICIES
to a new locality with less favorable employment opportunities 2 4 or
because of adherence to personal preference for certain types'25 or
hours of work.12 6 Generally speaking it can be said that the adminis-
trative agencies and courts have succeeded in developing workable
and fairly uniform criteria and tests to implement the broad statu-
tory concepts of "availability" and "suitability." In the application
of the disqualification for voluntary leaving greater fluctuations are
observable which, at least in part, are due to the statutory variations
in the definition of acceptable grounds for quitting.'2 7
3. Limitations on amounts and duration of benefits. The protection
accorded by the system is also limited with respect to the measure of
benefits. There are no federal minimum requirements and the state
laws show wide variations, both in weekly amounts and duration. 2 8
Moreover, the methods of computation differ greatly. Unfortunately
there is no common agreement on the standards of adequacy, a fact
which has its roots in conflicting views on the social objectives of
the system.m
It would seem that the first question to be solved concerns the
duration of the income maintenance under unemployment insurance.
Apparently in the United States, in contrast to the situation in some
foreign countries,130 there is widespread agreement on the proposition
306, 18 N.W.2d 249 (1945).; Department of Industrial Relations v. Chapman,
74 So. 2d 621 (Ala. App. 1954), to the feeling of being unappreciated, Allen v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. 174 Pa. Super 514, (1954)X 102 A.2d 195
or the actual chance or mere hope for financial improvement or more at-
tractive work, see, e.g., Consiglio v. Administrator Unempl. Comp. Act, 137
Conn. 693, 81 A.2d 351 (1951) (acceptance of better paying job causes dis-
qualification); Cornell v. Augaitis, 117 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio C.P. 1953) (factory in-
spector quitting to work as commission salesman).
124. Compare the recent discussions of the effects of such removal or en-
titlement to benefits in Dan River Mills Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n,
195 Va. 997, 81 S.E.2d 620 (1954) held: disqualification for voluntary leaving,
but no effect on availability), with claim of Sapp, 266 P.2d 1027 (Idaho 1954)
(held: pattern of removal showed lack of availability) and Wiley v. Carroll,
201 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. 1947).
125. See, e.g., Berthiaume v. Christgau, 218 Minn. 65, 15 N.W.2d 115 (1944)
(journeyman boilermaker need not accept job as truck-driver); Lowe's, Inc.
v. California Empl. Stabilization Comm'n. 76 Cal. App. 2d 231, 172 P.2d 938
(1946) (extra player, a 56-year old woman dancer, not justified in restricting
job opportunity to work in groups of less than 30 extras).
126. Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 61 N.W.2d 526 (Minn.
1953).
127. COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS AS OF AUGUST
1954, op. cit. supra note 72, at 80.
128. Id. at 56, 67.
129. An excellent exposition of the different views (and their evolution)
on the functions of unemployment insurance and their implications for the
adequacy of benefits is given by Burns, Unemployment Compensation and
Socio-economic Objectives, 55 YALE L.J. 1 (1945). A more recent analysis
of the problem can be found in U.S. BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DEP'T
OF LABOR, ADEQUACY OF BENEFITS UNDER UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (1952).
For a somewhat one-sided presentation see Hubbard, Adequacy of Unem-
ployment Compensation Benefits, 10 AM. ECON. SECUR. 36(1953). Consult also
Downs, New Ideas of Benefit Rates, 21 EMPLOYMENT SECURITY REv. No. 10, 14
(1954).
130. New Zealand is the pioneer country having unlimited duration, New
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that unemployment insurance is designed to accord protection only
against frictional and short term cyclical idleness but not to carry the
burden of a prolonged depression. Whether the system performs even
that function can be gauged by the exhaustion statistics, especially
the exhaustion rates, i.e., the number of persons exhausting their
benefits expressdd as a percentage of the total number of persons re-
ceiving first payments. These data show for instance that even in
as good a year as 1953 the exhaustion rates for 11 states exceeded the
rate of 30 and for 18 states the rate of 25.131 For the year 1954 the total
picture is much worse.132 As a result the President in his recent
Economic Report has urged the states which have not done so
13 3 to
extend the duration of their benefits to at least 26 weeks.
134
Since unemployment insurance is a short term program it would
seem that even the minimum benefits should at least be adequate
to maintain the normal beneficiary at the subsistence level without
need of supplementation from general assistance or other resources. In
addition the system should make up for an appropriate portion of the
wage loss. Originally unemployment insurance was designed to com-
pensate the majority of the insured workers for 50% of their wage loss.
,Gradually the statutory ceilings in most states have caused the average
benefits to fall increasingly short of even this original accomplish-
ment. 3 5 The President's Economic Report for 1955 deplores "this loss
of a clear relation between benefits and a worker's usual earnings or
his customary living standards [as] inconsistent with the incentives
of a free economy"'136 and urges the states to retrieve the lost ground
of economic security. Of course, the only practical way to assure such
correlation between state wage levels and benefits is a built-in auto-
matic adjustment factor in the benefit formula, as for instance a tie
Zealand Social Security Act, 1938 § 54(3), NEw ZEALAND STATS. 1251 (1948)
(reprint with amendments incorporated). In the United Kingdom the
Beveridge report advocated unlimited benefits, but the government's White
Paper on Social Insurance, CMD. No. 6550, rejected this proposal and recom-
mended a duration of 30 weeks. The act as passed provided for a standard
benefit duration of 180 days with the possibility of a limited administrative
extension, National Insurance Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEo. 6, c. 67 §§ 12, 62. See
TILLYARD, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN GREAT BRITAIN 1911-1948. 185 (1949).
131. Hearings before House Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 6537, 6539,
7054, 8857 and 8585, 245 (1954).
132. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 56, 158 (1955). According to
the Report, 1,610,000 exhausted their benefit rights in the first 11 months of
1954.
133. As of 1954, 25 states were short of the 26 weeks' goal even for maximum
duration, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS AS OF
AUGUST 1954 op. cit. supra note 72, at 68.
134. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 56 (1955).
135. Id. at 55 (1955). In Michigan, for instance, the compensated portion
of the average weekly wage sank from 46.4% (1938) to 31.5% (1954). Downs,
supra note 129, at 15. Massachusetts, however, apparently formed an im-
portant exception see GALENSON, A REPORT ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
BENEFIT COSTS IN MASSACHUSETTS is (Mass., Div. of Empl. Sec. 1950).
136. Economic Report of the President 55 (1955).
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between the average weekly wage in covered employment and the
statutory maximum for weekly benefits. 37
While it can be accepted that unemployment insurance should play
only a circumscribed role within the total framework of provisions
for social security, an intolerable situation arises if its patterns and
policies bog down under so many limitations that it becomes a fair
appraisal to speak of "relevant unemployment compensation fail-
ures."1
38
b. Allocation of Costs.
Only little need and can be said, within the framework of this study,
about the highly controversial subject of financing. Since unemploy-
ment compensation is short-term social insurance against a specifically
industrial risk, no case can be made for an adherence to the contribu-
tory principle. Only two states still allocate a share to the worker.139
In all other states the system is exclusively employer-financed. But
when it comes to the matter of timing the burden and of distributing
it among the covered employers, the heatedly debated ground of ap-
propriateness and proper method of experience rating is reached.140
The chief reason for the introduction of experience rating as one of
the standards of cost allocation was its purported effect of stimulating
employment stabilization which, according to a still widely held view,
is one of the principal objectives of unemployment insurance.141 The
arguments against experience rating stem from a basic disagreement
with this idea, coupled with the very strong apprehension that this
device is bound to exert a destructive impact on the economic security
which unemployment insurance aims to achieve. Without attempting
to be exhaustive it can be stated that five major- not always con-
137. See the proposals and discussion by Downs, supra note 129.
138. Harris, Economics of the Guaranteed Wage, 78 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 159,
163 (1955).
139. Ala. and N.J., U.S. BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DEP'T OF LABOR,
COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS AS OF AUGUST 1954
15 (1954).
140. For bibliographical references see RIESENFELD AND MAXWELL, MODERN
SOCIAL LEGISLATION 497 (1950). The subject is treated in the present symposium
in Teple and Nowacek, Experience Rating: its objectives, Problems and Eco-
nomic Interpretations, infra at 376. In addition consult the comments on experi-
ence rating in the famous Latimer Report, Guaranteed Wages, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT BY THE ADVISORY BOARD, OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION AND RECONVER-
sIoN 37 (1947) and the ill-taken observations thereon by Schmidt, Private Guar-
anteed Wages and Unemployment Compensation Supplementation, PROCEEDINGS
OF SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 96,
100, 102 (1953). For a more recent examination of the subject see MERRIAM,
SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING 75 (Federal Security Agency, Social Security Ad-
ministration, Bureau Report No. 17 1952); Andrews and Miller, Unemploy-
ment Benefits, Experience Rating and Employment Stability, 7 NAT. TAX
J. 193 (1954).
141. See Hubbard, Adequacy of Unemployment Compensation Benefits, 10
Am. Econ. Secur. 36 (1953); but see Burns, Unemployment Compensation and
Socio-Economic Objectives, 55 YALE L. J. 1, at 7 (1945).
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sistent - arguments have been advanced for the abolition of experi-
ence rating, viz. that it
(1) Imposes reduced burdens in good years and increased burdens in bad
years and thereby tends to offset the anti-cyclical effects of unemploy-
ment insurance;
(2) creates internal pressures which make for inadequate benefit pro-
visions and insufficient reserves;
(3) is impotent to achieve stabilization and merely grants a bonus to
stable rather than stabilized industries, thus introducing inequitable
discriminations within the industry as a whole;
(4) threatens desirable labor mobility;
(5) renders benefit administration excessively litigious.
Undoubtedly experience rating harbors many of these intrinsic
dangers and in many states has produced some of these deleterious re-
sults. But there seems to be no inexorable law which militates against
the possibility of devising a workable scheme of differentiated cost
allocation. There seems to be proof that, at least for short cycle fluc-
tuations, a rate structure could be devised, the variations of which are
cyclically stabilizing. 14 Whether long range cost predictions of suf-
ficient practical reliability are really possible is a worrisome question.
At any rate great strides have been made towards that goal and numer-
ous states have tried to secure scientific long range estimates of their
financial liabilities in the light of their particular industrial stratifica-
tion and development. 143 Unfortunately the great susceptibility to
change of the benefit formulae adds a forbidding number of variables
to the inherent complexities.
Experience rating has become a universal feature of the state em-
ployment security acts since the termination of World War H1.144 The
actual practice shows a tremendous diversity in the operative systems,
although the great majority of them can be reduced to the so-called
reserve-ratio formula.145 Since this method directly relates employer's
contributions to benefits paid to his employees, the State of New York
rejected it for a considerable period. In 1951, however, New York
reversed its attitude and passed legislation 146 by which it joined the
142. See the study by Andrews and Miller, supra note 140.
143. See the Galenson report for Massachusetts, A REPORT ON UNEMPLOY-
iVIENT COMPENSATION BENEFIT COSTS I MASSACHUSETTS (Mass. Div. of Empl.
Sec. 1950). For a discussion of the technical assumptions and methods see id.
at 55, 71.
144. Thompson, Financing Unemployment Insurance in the United States,
69 POL. ScI. Q. 92 (1954).
145. COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANcE LAWS AS OF AuGUST
1954, op. cit. supra note 72, at 19.
146. N.Y. Laws 1951 c. 645, p. 1492.
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camp of the majority of states. It took this step as a result of the
recommendations of the Joint Legislative Committee on Unemploy-
ment Insurance147 which deplored the "lack of financial incentive"
to "active cooperation" by the employers "in auditing disbursements
and controlling claims."'1 48 But in order to eliminate latent inequities
three additional factors, viz. the "quarterly factor," the "age factor"
and the "annual factor"'149 were included in the overall rating formula.
While the existing variations should reflect a healthy trend towards
experimentation, which is one of the great opportunities of the federal
system, they are unfortunately indicative of a dangerous propensity
for degenerating into a competition for low benefits and contribu-
tions.150 The methods of allocating the costs of unemployment consti-
tute an integral and sensitive part of the whole system and must not
fall victim to irresponsible and shortsighted pressures.
Conclusion
Unemployment Insurance in the United States does not look as
good in 1955 as it did in 1935. This is partly due to change in the
setting. To a country which was just beginning to rally from the worst
depression in its history the new system appeared as a shiny and im-
pregnable bulwark against insecurity. Meanwhile economic activity
has reached an unprecedented height, and there is a growing convic-
tion that society possesses other andd more effective means for taming
and controlling the deflationary forces and for buttressing the level.
of employment. Unemployment Insurance consequently is now mainly
thought of as a second line of defense, and its chief permanent func-
tion is to bridge the gap caused by frictional and other transitional
unemployment. Unfortunately, in this respect protection has not only
not kept up with new needs, but has actually slipped in performance.
This does not mean that the whole edifice is structurally unsound
and inevitably doomed to collapse. But it signifies that definite efforts
must be made to widen the area of protection and to keep the benefits
in line with the rising tide of wages. In addition, correlation with
other provisions for income maintenance needs careful attention. Most
of all, cost allocation must be placed on a sound and equitably sup-
147. N.Y., Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Unemployment
Insurance, Legislative Document No. 79 (1951).
148. Id. at 39.
149. Id. at 40. For a brief summary see also Reticker, The New York State
Unemploument Insurance Amendments of 1951, 73 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 541
(1951). The results of the first year of actual operation are summarized in N.Y.
Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Unemployment Insurance 2
(mimeo 1953).
150. This is the verdict of Harris, Economics of the Guaranteed Wage, 78
MONTHLY LABOR REV. 159, 163 (1955).
1955 ]
244 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8
ported foundation. Otherwise, it is manifest that the system will suc-
cumb to the pressures from within and have to be replaced by totally
new arrangements.
